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Abstract
Background and Objectives
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a trans-diagnostic construct involved in anxiety and
related disorders. Research focused on cross-sectional reporting, manipulating attitudes
toward objective and impersonal events or on treatments designed to reduce IU in clinical
populations. The current paper presents an experimental procedure for laboratory manip-
ulations of IU and tests mediation hypotheses following the Intolerance of Uncertainty
Model.
Methods
On pre-test, undergraduate volunteers (Study 1, n = 43;68% women. Study 2, n = 169;83.8%
women) were asked to provide an idiosyncratic future negative life event. State-IU, Worry,
Positive and Negative Affect were assessed after that a standardized procedure was used to
identify event’s potential negative consequences. The same variables were assessed on
post-test, after that participants were asked to read-through increasing and decreasing IU
statements.
Results
Temporary changes on IU were consistently reproduced in both studies. Participants
receiving increasing IU instructions reported greater state-IU, Worry and Negative Affect
than those receiving decreasing IU instructions. However, this latter condition was not differ-
ent from a control one (Study 2). Both studies revealed significant indirect effects of IU
induction instructions on Worry and Negative Affect through state-IU.
Limitations
Both studies used undergraduate psychology students samples, younger than average
population and predominantly female. Experimental manipulation and outcome measures
belongs to the same semantic domain, uncertainty, potentially limiting generalizability.
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Conclusions
Results supported the feasibility and efficacy of the proposed IU manipulation for non-clini-
cal sample. Findings parallel clinical research showing that state-IU preceded Worry and
Negative Affect states.
Introduction
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) was first delineated as a construct of interest for “representing
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to uncertainty in everyday life situations” [1].
The construct was focused initially on understanding worry and generalized anxiety disorder
[2–4]; however, recent evidence now suggests IU represents a critical trans-diagnostic con-
struct for understanding neuroticism [5, 6–7, 3, 8, 9]. There is also broad evidence [10] that
fearful responses to unknowns, typically measured as IU, are important for models of emotion
[11], attachment [12], and personality [13]. Accordingly, the definition has been revised several
times [5], with the most recent stating that IU is “an individual’s dispositional incapacity to
endure the aversive response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient
information, and sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty” [7].
The broad importance of fearing the unknown and IU led to clinical research studies explor-
ing interventions targeting the IU construct [14, 15, 5, 7, 8]. Most research has focused on reduc-
ing worry in patients with GAD, following the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model [16]. In the
IUM, uncertainty drives worry, perceived as an effective strategy to cope with uncertainty, but
producing a worrying chain. Effective treatments for reducing IU have included individual
[17,18] and small group therapy sessions [19] using a cognitive-behavioral approach specifically
targeting IU that facilitates re-evaluation of positive beliefs about worry, cognitive exposure, and
problem-solving. The treatments reduced IU, causally related to changes in worry [19,17,18],
and reduced somatic symptoms, general anxiety and depression [18,19], for up to 2-years [19].
Besides clinical research, there is mounting evidence that IU is an individual difference vari-
able that biases one’s appraisal of outcomes and probability in behavioral decision making. For
instance, Jacoby et al. [20] have shown that trait IU was associated with Negative Affective
reactions to uncertainty using a probabilistic inference task, in which people have to decide
from which of two jars a series of beads has been drawn. Furthermore, Luhmann, Ishida, &
Hajcak [21] showed that higher trait IU was associated with greater preferences for risky
options that might provide an immediate smaller reward than for risky options that might con-
fer a delayed greater reward. Thus, trait IU predicted a disadvantageous risky choice pattern,
not merely risk perception or distress with uncertainty, in keeping with behavioral studies on
trait anxiety and performance in the Iowa Gambling Task [22–24]. More recently, Carleton
et al. [10] found a significant positive association of trait IU with performance in a Risky-Gains
Task, in which research participants had very limited time to decide between a sooner non-
risky option and two risky options presented later. Specifically, high trait IU individuals pre-
ferred an immediate safe reward rather than waiting for risky options that could be more
advantageous in terms of expected returns. As a whole, this literature has shown that individual
differences in IU affected probability judgment and risky choices.
Intolerance of uncertainty manipulation in laboratory settings: state of the
art
Inducing temporary changes in IU state is a challenging issue, especially for non-clinical partici-
pants in experimental settings. Treatment studies to date typically involved clinical samples
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characterized by high levels of IU. In addition, time-, skill-, and effort-demanding cognitive behav-
ioral therapy techniques were used in these studies, which would be difficult tools for studying IU
in non-clinical designs (e.g., social or cognitive psychology experiments). Instead, researchers
studying IU would benefit from being able to experimentally manipulate the construct and associ-
ated behaviors irrespective of clinical status. Initial laboratory-based manipulations have been
devised to study causal links between IU and higher order cognitive processing [18,25].
Ladouceur and colleagues [18] built an experimental manipulation of IU using a computer-
ized roulette game, in which the uncertainty about the outcome of the game was manipulated.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: increased or
decreased uncertainty [18]. Each participant was given $20 to play with the computerized game
and the experimenter informed participants that their winnings would be donated to a fictitious
Foundation if each participant’s winnings were equal to or greater than the initial amount given
to the participants. If the final amount was less than the initial $20, nothing would be donated
to the Foundation. Participants in the “increased uncertainty” group received information
throughout the game that their chances of winning (probability) were low (i.e., the experimenter
said: “your chances of winning are much lower than those used in previous studies with this
task”). In contrast, the “decreased uncertainty” group received information that their chances
were high. Participants in the high uncertainty condition reported significantly more worry;
however, the authors did not assess baseline IU or worry before the experimental manipulation,
which was an important experimental limitation. In addition, a computerized roulette game
about a fictitious Foundation may not be sufficiently ecologically valid relative to clinical
research using personally relevant events [17, 19, 18]. Finally, the manipulations used focused
on probabilities and therefore might be manipulations of perceived risk rather than uncertainty.
Grenier and Ladouceur [25] bridged the gap between non-clinical and clinical experimental
designs by manipulating IU with a two-stage crossover experimental design. On pre-test, par-
ticipants were invited to reveal a negative life event that might occur in the future (e.g., be
refused to higher education). A “Vertical Arrow Technique” [26] was then used to help partici-
pants identify several negative sequelae. Then, participants were asked to imagine that they
ingested a drug that had provoked an unpredictable effect (other than relieve an headache or to
alleviate a bad cough) and then assigned to one of two alternative IU manipulation conditions.
One week later, participants repeated the same procedure, but they were assigned to the other
IU manipulation condition. The results supported the manipulations as effective at increasing
IU, but only for participants who reported relatively low state anxiety at pre-test. In contrast,
the manipulations were effective at decreasing IU for all participants, which was in line with
earlier clinical findings [17, 19, 18].
Grenier and Ladouceur [25] might be extended in two important ways. First, we suggest
that focusing on a personal negative future life event, rather than an event posited by the
research team (i.e., imagining that they had ingested a drug), and then manipulating percep-
tions of that idiosyncratic event, could produce a more salient, coherent, and effective manipu-
lation. Second, Grenier and Ladouceur [25] used a counterbalanced crossover requiring
repeated checks of manipulation, mood, and IU, as well as trained clinical psychologists for
running the Vertical Arrow Procedure; in contrast, the proposed procedure uses a standardized
and abridged variation of Grenier and Ladouceur [25] to facilitate use in several non-clinical
settings (e.g., social or cognitive psychology experiments).
Study 1
The first study was designed to pilot test the feasibility, and potential efficacy, of different IU
inducing instructions on short-term worries and IU levels in laboratory setting. The experimental
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manipulation replicated Grenier and Ladouceur [25], but attempted to extend their procedure by
1) having participants focus on an idiosyncratically-selected potential negative event–instead of a
neutral event; and 2) having participants self-administer the manipulation.
Methods
Participants. Participants included 43 undergraduate volunteers (68% women), recruited
in the University library to attend a two-session study. Participants were prescreened to deter-
mine whether any report exceeding the psychological distress cut-off score on the Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale [27] and the presence of a potential clinical sub-sample. No par-
ticipant exceeded the cut-off scores of the scale. Session 1 occurred during the morning and
session 2 during the afternoon of the same day. Session 1 involved the pre-test, whereas session
2 involved the experimental manipulation and the post-test. Participants were compensated
with a 5€ phone credit card awarded after they completed the second session. The study was
approved by the ethical committee of the Department of Social and Developmental Psychol-
ogy, University of Rome “Sapienza” (#62-CED-01).
Measures
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, Short Form. The IUS-12 [28] was back-translated into
Italian by the authors for use in the current study. The IUS-12 is a short version of the original
27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale [1] and measures responses to uncertainty. The 12
items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to
5 (entirely characteristic of me). The IUS-12 total score can represent trait IU [29], which is
how it was used in the current study. In the current study the internal consistency for the total
score was .97.
Worry and Intolerance of Uncertainty Questionnaire. The Worry and Intolerance of
Uncertainty Questionnaire (Q-III) [25] is a scale specifically developed to assess fluctuations in
the level of IU and Worry. In Grenier and Ladouceur [25], the QIII was comprised of 9 items,
each of which required participants to write a number from 0 (i.e. = no) to 12 (i.e. = extremely)
in empty blanks within each item to express their response. In this study, we used a more stan-
dard Likert-type scale aside of each item 0 (I totally disagree with the item) to 12 (I totally agree
with the item). In addition, two control items (i.e., item 1, “When I think that the negative
events mentioned above may indeed occur I consider this possibility acceptable” and item 4,
“The experimenter is able to assure me (100%) that the negative events mentioned above will
never occurr”) [25] were removed due to zero variance on a pilot administration. The Q-III
administered in this study was indeed comprised of 7 items only, of which four assessed state-
IU (i.e.: “I agree with the following statement: I always want to know what my future sets aside
for me”) and three assessed Worry (i.e. “I think that the negative events mentioned above
worry me”). The internal consistency for the state-IU andWorry at pre-test were .83 and .86,
respectively. At post-test the coefficients were .83 and .92, respectively.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The PANAS [30, 31] is a 20-item measure that
assesses positive and negative affect states on two 10-item subscales related to positive (e.g.,
cheerful) and negative emotions (e.g., sluggish), respectively. For each item, participants were
asked to describe how they felt “at the moment” on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1
(very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very much). Positive and Negative Affect scores were obtained
summing up the respective items. The internal consistency for negative and Positive Affect at
pre-test was .91 and .85, respectively. At post-test the coefficients were .93 and .87, respectively.
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Procedures
Session 1. Pre-test. Participant condition assignment was based on alternating recruit-
ment order (e.g., the first participant was assigned to the increasing IU condition, the second to
the decreasing condition, continuing alternating throughout collection). Participants assigned
to the increasing IU condition were expected to report higher scores on measures of worry and
IU than those assigned to the decreasing IU condition. At arrival for session 1 of the study each
participant was acquainted with the expected duration, general procedure, and compensation
for participation. The study was presented as related to individual differences in personality
and cognition, with no specifics provided about the intended IU manipulation. Participants
were informed that they could leave at anytime without losing their compensation. All partici-
pants who arrived at the lab provided informed consent to participate and all participated in
both sessions. All questionnaires were completed as paper and pencil tools.
During session 1, participants completed the pre-test questionnaires. Like Grenier and
Ladouceur [25], participants were asked to provide an idiosyncratic negative life event that
might occur in the future (e.g., being fired from work; failing an exam). A standardized self-
administered VAT procedure was used to identify several potential negative consequences that
would result from the provided negative event. The self-administration involved a hierarchical
schema presented to each participant on an A3 size paper (see S1 Appendix). On the first level,
a box allowed the participant to write down the potential negative future outcome. The first
box was connected via downward arrows to three smaller boxes on a second level, each of
which could be filled in with a potential consequence, if the first level event occurred. Any par-
ticipants unable to provide three consequences from the top level event were instructed to
leave one or more boxes empty. Each second level box was subsequently connected via down-
ward arrows to three boxes at a third level, each of which could be filled with a potential conse-
quence, if any second level event occurred. Again, participants could leave one or more boxes
empty. After the diagram was completed the modified Q-III and the PANAS were adminis-
tered to assess state-IU and mood.
Session 2. Experimental manipulation. Session 2 occurred during the afternoon of the
same-day as Session 1. Each participant was asked to recall the potential future negative event
that he/she provided during session 1; thereafter, participants were assigned to an increasing
(n = 22) or decreasing (n = 21) IU condition. Participants assigned to the increasing IU condi-
tion were asked to read and repeat aloud the all the statements reported by Grenier and Ladou-
ceur [25], such as, “Concerning the negative event it's difficult not know what will happen”.
Participants assigned to the decreasing IU condition were asked to read and repeat aloud state-
ments such as, “It doesn't bother me to not know what will happen to me” (detailed in S2
Appendix). Statements were presented individually and sequentially on a desktop computer
with each participant’s idiosyncratic negative life event affixed to the top of the screen and used
as memory cue.
Post-test. The QIII and PANAS were administered after the experimental manipulation,
therein assessing participant reactions to each of the two IU conditions. The post-test adminis-
trations allowed for comparisons with the pre-test scores on the QIII and PANAS, therein
determining the effectiveness of the manipulation. Lastly, participants were debriefed regarding
the experimental hypotheses.
Statistical Analyses
The data were preliminarily checked for univariate outliers. Descriptive statistics for study vari-
ables used for outliers detection and testing assumptions are reported in Table 1 (Panel a).
Three cases were identified and removed from subsequent analyses. Parametric assumptions
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for ANCOVA were tested, including normal distribution and homoscedasticity. Minor viola-
tions were detected and the analyses re-run based on non-parametric analyses [32,33]. Media-
tion analyses were carried out by INDIRECT SPSS procedure. The statistical significance of
indirect effects was based on bootstrap bias corrected confidence intervals [34]. More details
about statistical procedures are provided in S3 Appendix.
Results
Participants in increasing IU or decreasing IU conditions were compared on sex ratios using
chi-square tests and on IUS-12 scores using independent-samples t-tests. No significant differ-
ences were found between the two conditions. Likewise, the two conditions did not differ on
pre-test scores for all variables but only for Positive Affect, t(38) = 2.08, p> .05, η2 = .10 (aver-
age scores 3.18 vs. 2.81 for decreasing and increasing IU, respectively). Post-test scores were
largely correlated with pre-test ones (rs .85, .73, .89 and .73 for state-IU, Worry, Positive and
Negative Affect, respectively). Differences and autocorrelations were accounted for in the data
analyses [35].
As expected, ANCOVAs by condition resulted significant effects of covariates (i.e., pre-test
scores) on dependent variables (i.e., post-test scores) (all ps< .001). The condition effect con-
trolling for covariates was fully significant for state-IU, F(1,37) = 13.93, p< .001, partial η2 =
.27, and Negative Affect, F(1,37) = 17.28, p< .001, partial η2 = .32; marginally significant for
Worry, F(1,37) = 2.23, p = .14, partial η2 = .06; and no significant at all for Positive Affect (par-
tial η2 = .03). Participants in the increased IU condition reported higher state-IU, Worry, and
Negative Affect than those in the decreased IU condition (Fig 1). Because we detected marginal
violations of normality assumptions (see Table 1, Panel a), we re-examined our hypothesis by
non-parametric analyses to check whether and to what extent the results obtained from
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and tests of assumptions for Study 1 (Panel a) and Study 2 (Panel b) variables.
Panel a) Pre-test M SD Sk K S-W p-level L p-level
Positive Affect 3,01 0,57 -0,03 -1,00 0,96 Ns 0,24 ns
Negative Affect 1,67 0,68 1,14 0,79 0,87 p < .01 0,18 ns
IU 4,84 2,09 0,47 -0,68 0,95 p = .09 0,57 ns
Worry 7,10 2,15 -0,17 -0,35 0,98 Ns 0,61 ns
Posttest
Positive Affect 3,02 0,58 0,13 -0,46 0,98 Ns 0,15 ns
Negative Affect 1,67 0,68 0,91 -0,21 0,86 p < .01 1,88 ns
IU 3,85 1,65 0,63 -0,36 0,94 p < .05 1,55 ns
Worry 5,30 2,91 0,15 -1,06 0,95 p = .09 0,41 ns
Panel b) Pre-test M SD Sk K S-W p-level L p-level
Positive Affect 58,47 19,53 -0,33 -0,27 0,98 p < .05 2,14 ns
Negative Affect 35,55 20,87 0,29 -0,68 0,97 p < .01 0,39 ns
IU 5,64 2,01 0,18 -0,33 0,99 Ns 0,21 ns
Worry 7,60 2,46 -0,39 -0,53 0,97 p < .01 0,51 ns
Posttest
Positive Affect 57,98 19,03 -0,25 -0,14 0,98 Ns 1,18 ns
Negative Affect 33,40 20,90 0,42 -0,53 0,97 p < .01 1,82 ns
IU 5,52 2,10 0,11 -0,34 0,99 Ns 1,20 ns
Worry 6,87 2,45 -0,24 -0,40 0,99 Ns 1,26 ns
Note: Sk = Univariate Skewness; K Univariate Kurtosis; S-W = Shapiro-Wilks normality test; L = Levene's test of variance homogeneity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155130.t001
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previous analyses were biased. Since Parametric ANCOVA and nonparametric RANCOVA
gave nearly identical results (F = 13.78, p< .001 for state-IU; F = 17.56, p< .001 Negative
Affect; F = 2.28, p = .14 for Worry) we concluded that “the assumptions underlying the usual
analysis of variance are likely to be reasonable and the regular parametric analysis valid” [36].
These findings supported the main hypothesis that IU induction affected state-IU, Worry and
Negative Affect for participants.
Consistent with the IUM [2,37], IU induction appeared to trigger a worrying chain through
increased state-IU. Accordingly, we tested indirect effects of IU induction onWorry and Nega-
tive Affect post-test scores through state-IU, controlling for pre-test scores (Fig 2a). The analy-
sis was overall statistically significant for both Worry, R2 = .77, F(4,35) = 29.27, p< .001, and
Negative Affect, R2 = .72, F(4,35) = 22.18, p< .001. Importantly, state-IU fully mediated the
relation between IU induction and Worry (c = .56; p< .01 and c’ = .10; p = ns) and partially
Fig 1. ANCOVA by condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155130.g001
Fig 2. Mediation analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155130.g002
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mediated that between IU induction and Negative Affect (c = .78; p< .01 and c’ = .55; p< .05).
Since the putative mediating variable (i.e., state-IU) was measured at the same time as post-
manipulation Negative Affect and Worry, an alternative account of experimental findings
could be that IU induction affected state-IU through Worry or Negative Affect. As such, alter-
native mediation analyses were carried out in which mediator and dependent variables were
reversed (Fig 2b). Again the analysis was overall statistically significant for both Worry, R2 =
.89, F(4,35) = 73.02, p< .001, and Negative Affect, R2 = .83, F(4,35) = 45.70, p< .001. The indi-
rect effects for IU induction on state-IU through Worry and Negative Affect were also signifi-
cant (all p-s> .05). However, mediation relations were only partial (c = .51; p< .01 and c’ =
.27; p< .05 for Worry as mediator; c = .53; p< .01 and c’ = .34; p< .05). Based on these find-
ings we could not rule out the alternative account that IU induction affected state IU through
Worry or Negative Affect. This issue is addressed in the following study.
Study 2
Study 1 supported IU induction as significantly influencing state-IU and therein Worry and
Negative Affect; however, there were three major limitations. First, there was no control group.
Second, results of the mediation analyses were comparable for alternative models (i.e., IU-
induction effects on state Negative Affect through state-IU vs. IU-induction effects on state-
IU through Negative Affect). Last, the time’s interval which separated the induction of IU
occurred in the pre-test (morning) and the manipulation of IU occurred at the post-test (after-
noon) was relatively small, increasing the possibility of carryover effects. Study 2 was designed
to replicate Study 1 as well as to resolve these limitations by including a control condition, set-
ting a longer time interval between sessions and comparing two mediation models using con-
firmatory path analyses.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 169 undergraduate psychology students (82.8% women,
ages ranging from 19 to 51,M = 24.83; SD = 4.74) who participated in the two-session
study. Unlike Study 1, Session 2 was carried out 7-to-14 days after Session 1 (M = 9.98 days;
SD = 2.15 days), in which a pre-test was done, including assessment of trait IU and filling in
the VAT sheet. Students participated in exchange for course credits. The study was approved
by the ethical committee of the Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, Univer-
sity of Rome “Sapienza” (#62-CED-01).
Procedure and materials. All questionnaires were completed as paper and pencil tools.
Pre-test generally followed the procedures outlined for in Study 1 except for: 1) only the IUS-
12 was administered before the VAT; 2) four mood adjectives were administered along the
Q-III after the VAT on pre-test and after taking IU induction instructions on post-test. Switch-
ing from PANAS to mood adjectives made the experimental procedure less cumbersome for
both experimenter and participants. Moreover, the four adjectives (i.e., Happy, Sad, Calm,
Anxious) were selected to represent high-low arousal unpleasant-pleasant emotions according
to the Russell’s circumplex model of affect [38]. Participants rated how each adjective
described their feelings “at the moment” on a Visual Analog Scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100
(Completely). Positive and Negative affective states were operationalized by averaging Happy
and Calm ratings as well as Sad and Anxious ratings, respectively. This procedure yielded Posi-
tive and Negative Affect scores that are balanced in terms of affect activation [39]. Additional
procedural variations included: 1) a longer time-interval between Session 1 and Session 2 to
reduce carryover effects that could potentially confound the IU induction effects with the IU
manipulation effects; 2) full review of the VAT before taking IU induction instructions to
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refresh participant memory for the negative event and uncertain consequences; and 3) reading
statements off of the computer screen instead of repeating them aloud to better focus on the
manipulation statements. The QIII and Mood Adjectives were administered post-manipula-
tion to assess participant reactions to the different IU conditions. Participants were randomly
assigned using the MS Excel random generator function to an increasing IU condition
(n = 59), to a decreasing IU condition (n = 58) or to a control condition (n = 52). In the control
condition participants were asked to read descriptive statements unrelated to the negative
event (e.g., “Everest is earth's highest mountain. Its peak is 8,848 meters above sea level”; details
in S2 Appendix).
Statistical analyses. As in Study 1, the data were preliminarily checked for univariate out-
liers. Two cases were identified and removed from subsequent analyses. Parametric assump-
tions for ANCOVA were substantially met (see Table 1, panel b). For the sake of prudence, and
consistent with Study 1, research hypotheses were re-examined based on non-parametric tests.
Mediation relations were tested through confirmatory path analysis models with manifest vari-
ables carried out by EQS 6.1 [40]. More details about statistical procedures are provided in S3
Appendix.
Results
A preliminary descriptive analysis of the IUS-12 scores collected at pre-test revealed that there
were no significant differences between participants later assigned either to the increased,
decreased IU or control conditions. Likewise, the three conditions did not differ on pre-test
scores for all variables. As in Study 1, post-test scores were largely correlated with pre-test
ones (rs .67, .66, .52, and .58 for state-IU, Worry, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect, respec-
tively) and their effects on post-test scores were significant in ANCOVAs by condition (all ps
< .001) except for Positive Affect. The time interval occurring between Session 1 and Session
2 had no significant effect on any dependent variable. Importantly, the condition effect was
fully significant for all variables except for Positive Affect (i.e., state-IU, F(3,163) = 8.05, p<
.001, partial η2 = .13; Negative Affect, F(3,163) = 6.46, p< .001, partial η2 = .11; Worry, F
(3,163) = 5.48, p< .001, partial η2 = .09). Participant in the increased IU condition experi-
enced higher IU, Worry, Negative Affect and Positive Affect than those in the decreased IU
condition (Fig 3); however, participants in decreasing IU condition resulted in post-test levels
of state-IU, Worry and Negative Affect scores that were as large as controls. Like Study 1,
parametric ANCOVA and nonparametric RANCOVA gave nearly identical results (F = 7.10,
p< .001 for state-IU; F = 6.29, p< .001 Negative Affect; F = 5.69, p< .001 for Worry).
Accordingly, instructions to increase IU were more effective determinants of change than
instructions to decrease IU.
In keeping with the IUM [2,37], mediation analyses were first conducted with state-IU
and Worry as endogenous variables (Fig 4). The associated fit indices supported the model
with state-IU as a mediator (χ2 = 4.12; df = 2; p = .13; CAIC = -8.10) more so than an alterna-
tive model with Worry as the mediator (χ2 = 6.27; df = 2; p< .05; CAIC = -5.95). Likewise,
the fit indices supported a model assuming state-IU as mediator (χ2 = 6.16; df = 2; p = .04;
CAIC = -6.06) more so than the alternative model with Negative Affect as the mediator
(χ2 = 12.37; df = 2; p< .001; CAIC = 0.14). Finally, the fit indices also supported a model
with state-IU as mediator (χ2 = 1.98; df = 2; p = .37; CAIC = -10.16) more so than the alterna-
tive model with Positive Affect as the mediator (χ2 = 18.51; df = 2; p< .001; CAIC = 6.28).
Models with State-IU as mediators had a better fit than models reversing the order of media-
tor and dependent variables, thus expanding the IUM beyond the clinical settings to the
community.
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Fig 3. ANCOVA by condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155130.g003
Fig 4. Mediation analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155130.g004
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Discussion
IU induction instructions for the current experiments were adapted from French to Italian fol-
lowing Grenier and Ladouceur [25], who carried out a similar investigation with Canadian par-
ticipants. Specifically, Grenier and Ladouceur [25] manipulated IU in a two-stage experiment
and used IU induction statements, read by the experimenter and then repeated aloud by the
participant, with a neutral fictitious event (i.e., imagining to have ingested a medication). In
the current experiments IU was induced by having participants consider (Study 1) or review
(Study 2) an idiosyncratically-selected potential negative event–instead of a fictitious neutral
event–and having participants self-administering the manipulation on the same day (Study 1)
or 7-to-14 days after pre-test (Study 2), in which they had disclosed the negative event.
Temporary changes on IU-states were consistently reproduced across studies. Specifically,
people receiving instructions designed to increase IU reported greater IU, Worry, and Negative
Affect than those receiving instructions designed to decrease IU, and than those in a control
condition, receiving merely diversionary ones; nevertheless, participants receiving instructions
designed to decrease IU were not statistically different from those in the control condition.
These findings replicated Grenier and Ladouceur [25], wherein increased IU was only reported
by participants with low scores on situational anxiety at pre-test, a condition that was also
likely to occur for our student sample participating to experiment as part of their course. Being
able to increase but not decrease IU, Worry, and Negative Affect under tightly controlled
experimental conditions contrasts previous clinical research [17,19,18]; however, the contrast
may result from floor effects, likely to occur in a non-clinical sample with relatively low IU
scores.
The current results extend IU theory [5,37] in several ways. First, reading statements
designed to decrease IU or to divert attention from uncertainty; as such, non-clinical partici-
pants may have spontaneously decreased Worry and Negative Affect elicited by the personal
negative event. Second, research participants, otherwise tending spontaneously to decrease
Worry and Negative Affect, temporary acquired a IU mindset reading-through specific core
beliefs statements (e.g., uncertainty is unacceptable and should be avoided; uncertainty is
stressful and upsetting’ or being uncertain is unfair) [41], which in turn increased event-related
Worry and Negative Affect. Accordingly, the current conclusions are consistent with the view
that IU beliefs influence worry in non-clinical and clinical populations [5,37].
Mediation analyses carried out by exploratory (Study 1) and confirmatory (Study 2)
approaches, showed statistically significant indirect effects of IU induction instructions on
changes in Worry and Negative Affect, which both appear mediated by changes in state-IU. In
particular, all models that represented the mediation chain from IU induction to state Worry,
Positive Affect, or Negative Affect through state IU always had a better fit to the data (and
likely approximating a true model) than models reversing dependent variables and the media-
tor. This findings parallel clinical research, showing that changes in IU often preceded changes
in Worry over the course of treatment and not the other way around [41, 42, 43, 17, 44]. The
results are also consistent with recent trends in personality literature wherein affective traits,
like IU, are related to consistent pattern of behavior, cognition, and goal pursuit across time
and situations [45, 46].
The methodological contribution expanded on Grenier and Ladouceur [25] in two ways.
First, experimenters did not require cognitive-behavioral training to induce specific IU states.
Second, participants did not require extensive interviewing. Accordingly, pending independent
replication, the methods can now be used in broader, non-clinical contexts. Indeed, the stan-
dardized procedure can be used to produce temporary IU mindsets related to personal negative
events as well as to potential negative outcomes during specific tasks (e.g., failing to provide a
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correct answer based on incomplete or missing information); accordingly, the changes may
produce detectable effects on task performance or on attitudes towards the task itself (e.g., poor
problem orientation; [47]), that can be later assessed by comparing research participants on
meaningful outcomes after being exposed to an increasing IU condition verses a control condi-
tion (e.g., waitlist; neutral).
The interplay of IU, anxiety, and cognitive performance has traditionally been studied by
relating self-reported IU scores to cognitive processing and affective states during experimen-
tal tasks (e.g., recalling uncertainty-related words, [48]; overestimating arousal on probability
judgment tasks, [49]). An implication of our finding is that increasing IU may be relevant to
affect performance on problem solving and decision-making tasks involving discount of
future consequences (e.g., inter-temporal choices), risk perception (e.g., increased likelihood
of negative outcomes and overestimation of their perceived costs, [50]) or risk-taking [51–53].
For instance, two recent studies have shown that high trait-IU is related to disadvantageous
choices when an uncertain greater reward is delayed in time relative to a smaller immediate
reward [10,21]. On the other hand, however, other recent studies have shown that both IU
and worry can be effective ways to cope with uncertain aversive events in laboratory settings
[54,55]. These studies were all based on self-report trait-IU measures, and in some cases
involved comparisons with clinical samples. Instead, researchers interested in judgment and
decision making or experimental social psychology would benefit from being able to experi-
mentally increase IU, irrespective of clinical status. Next studies should then test whether
increasing IU instructions, which were effective to increase worry for a personal negative
event, can also increase worry for future outcomes in behavioral decision tasks or in real life
health decisions.
Key limitations in the current studies also provide directions for future research. First,
despite the generally consistent results across the two studies, both studies used self-report data
collected from undergraduate psychology students. Student data may involve a selection bias
associated with personality characteristics and demographic variables that may relate to IU,
such as lower extraversion and conscientiousness, or younger age and predominantly female
gender [56]. These specific characteristics might have introduced uncontrolled systematic vari-
ance components in our experiments; accordingly, the results may not generalize to other pop-
ulations. Second, the experimental manipulation and the outcome measures both belonged to
the same semantic domain, uncertainty, potentially limiting generalizability. Accordingly, a
word priming effect may have occurred for state-IU questionnaire items. Future research
should attempt to replicate the current results using behavioral assessments, implicit measures,
or physiological measures, such as an Implicit Association Test [57], an Affect Misattribution
Procedure [58], or monitoring participants’ heart rate variability. Indeed, previous research
has suggested a critical relationship between uncertainty and heart rate variability [59]. Last,
although the VAT procedure was used in pre-test to collect participants personal negative
events and to assess IU-related beliefs and affects, we did not check whether this procedure
affected participants baseline IU, Worry or Negative Affect ratings. Some participants may
have been greatly affected by the VAT, and others may not have been affected at all. These indi-
vidual differences might have biased our pre-test data, introducing potentially systematic error
variance. Even if we controlled for pre-test scores in data analysis, future research should
address this issue through additional manipulation checks. Last, it is worth mentioning that we
did not assess research participants at any further time point. So we cannot say how long did
the increased states of IU last. For those interested in inducing a temporary IU mindset on
subsequent probability judgments or behavioral decisions, a very short-term IU increase can
be enough. Again, future research might help disentangling this issue setting an additional fol-
low up.
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the current studies validated an IU
manipulation procedure for reliably inducing changes in state-IU within cognitive processing
investigations. The results supported the efficacy of the procedure for experimental research.
Subsequent research on IU may now use the procedure to assess for causal relationships
between IU and perceptual and social judgments. We expect the results of such research will
further demonstrate the importance of IU as a multidisciplinary construct affecting clinical
and non-clinical cognitive processes.
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